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**Conference of the Parties**

Report of the Conference of the Parties on its twenty-fourth session, held in Katowice from 2 to 15 December 2018

Addendum

Part two: Action taken by the Conference of the Parties at its twenty-fourth session

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Decision 1/CP.24

Preparations for the implementation of the Paris Agreement and the first session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement

*The Conference of the Parties*,

*Recalling* the Paris Agreement, adopted under the Convention,

*Also recalling* decisions 1/CP.21, 1/CP.22, 1/CP.23, 1/CMA.1 and 3/CMA.1,

*Further recalling* decisions 6/CP.1, 6/CP.2, 25/CP.7, 5/CP.13, 12/CP.20 and 10/CP.21,

*Recalling*, in particular, decision 1/CP.21, paragraph 91, in which the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement was requested to develop recommendations for modalities, procedures and guidelines in accordance with Article 13, paragraph 13, of the Paris Agreement, and to define the year of their first and subsequent review and update, as appropriate, at regular intervals, for consideration by the Conference of the Parties at its twenty-fourth session with a view to forwarding them to the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement for consideration and adoption at its first session,

*Also recalling*,in particular,decision 1/CP.21, paragraph 98, in which it was decided that the modalities, procedures and guidelines of the enhanced transparency framework under the Paris Agreement shall build upon and eventually supersede the measurement, reporting and verification system established by decision 1/CP.16, paragraphs 40–47 and 60–64, and decision 2/CP.17, paragraphs 12–62, immediately following the submission of the final biennial reports and biennial update reports,

I. Paris Agreement work programme

1. *Congratulates* Parties that have ratified, accepted, approved or acceded to the Paris Agreement;

2. *Expresses* *its appreciation* to the subsidiary and constituted bodies for their work on the implementation of the work programme under the Paris Agreement pursuant to decisions 1/CP.21, 1/CP.22 and 1/CP.23;

3. *Reaffirms* that, in the context of nationally determined contributions to the global response to climate change, all Parties are to undertake and communicate ambitious efforts as defined in Articles 4, 7, 9, 10, 11 and 13 of the Paris Agreement with a view to achieving the purpose of this Agreement as set out in its Article 2;

4. *Decides* to forward the following draft decisions for consideration and adoption by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement at the third part of its first session:[[1]](#footnote-2)

*Matters relating to Article 4 of the Paris Agreement and paragraphs 22–35 of decision 1/CP.21*

(a) Draft decision -/CMA.1 titled “Further guidance in relation to the mitigation section of decision 1/CP.21” (now decision 4/CMA.1);

(b) Draft decision -/CMA.1 titled “Modalities and procedures for the operation and use of a public registry referred to in Article 4, paragraph 12, of the Paris Agreement” (now decision 5/CMA.1);

(c) Draft decision -/CMA.1 titled “Modalities, work programme and functions under the Paris Agreement of the forum on the impact of the implementation of response measures” (now decision 7/CMA.1);

*Matters relating to Article 6 of the Paris Agreement and paragraphs 36–40 of decision 1/CP.21*

(d) Draft decision -/CMA.1 titled “Matters relating to Article 6 of the Paris Agreement and paragraphs 36–40 of decision 1/CP.21” (now decision 8/CMA.1);

*Matters relating to Article 7 of the Paris Agreement and paragraphs 41, 42 and 45 of decision 1/CP.21*

(e) Draft decision -/CMA.1 titled “Further guidance in relation to the adaptation communication, including, inter alia, as a component of nationally determined contributions, referred to in Article 7, paragraphs 10 and 11, of the Paris Agreement” (now decision 9/CMA.1);

(f) Draft decision -/CMA.1 titled “Modalities and procedures for the operation and use of a public registry referred to in Article 7, paragraph 12, of the Paris Agreement” (now decision 10/CMA.1);

(g) Draft decision -/CMA.1 titled “Matters referred to in paragraphs 41, 42 and 45 of decision 1/CP.21” (now decision 11/CMA.1);

*Matters relating to Article 9 of the Paris Agreement and paragraphs 52–64 of decision 1/CP.21*

(h) Draft decision -/CMA.1 titled “Identification of the information to be provided by Parties in accordance with Article 9, paragraph 5, of the Paris Agreement” (now decision 12/CMA.1);

(i) “Modalities for the accounting of financial resources provided and mobilized through public interventions in accordance with Article 9, paragraph 7, of the Paris Agreement”;[[2]](#footnote-3)

(j) Draft decision -/CMA.1 titled “Matters relating to the Adaptation Fund” (now decision 13/CMA.1);

*Matters relating to Article 10 of the Paris Agreement and paragraphs 66–70 of decision 1/CP.21*

(k) Draft decision -/CMA.1 titled “Technology framework under Article 10, paragraph 4, of the Paris Agreement” (now decision 15/CMA.1);

(l) Draft decision -/CMA.1 titled “Scope of and modalities for the periodic assessment referred to in paragraph 69 of decision 1/CP.21” (now decision 16/CMA.1);

*Matters relating to Article 13 of the Paris Agreement and paragraphs 84–98 of decision 1/CP.21*

(m) Draft decision -/CMA.1 titled “Modalities, procedures and guidelines for the transparency framework for action and support referred to in Article 13 of the Paris Agreement” (now decision 18/CMA.1);[[3]](#footnote-4)

*Matters relating to Article 14 of the Paris Agreement and paragraphs 99–101 of decision 1/CP.21*

(n) Draft decision -/CMA.1 titled “Matters relating to Article 14 of the Paris Agreement and paragraphs 99–101 of decision 1/CP.21” (now decision 19/CMA.1);

*Matters relating to Article 15 of the Paris Agreement and paragraphs 102 and 103 of decision 1/CP.21*

(o) Draft decision -/CMA.1 titled “Modalities and procedures for the effective operation of the committee to facilitate implementation and promote compliance referred to in Article 15, paragraph 2, of the Paris Agreement” (now decision 20/CMA.1);

5. *Also decides* that the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement conducted in accordance with decision 1/CP.21 has been completed;

II. High-level ministerial dialogue on climate finance

6. *Welcomes* the third high-level ministerial dialogue on climate finance, convened in accordance with decision 3/CP.19, paragraph 13;

7. *Notes* that the dialogue highlighted progress in and remaining barriers to translating climate finance needs into action and enhancing developing countries’ access to climate finance;

8. *Welcomes with appreciation* the pledges and announcements of Parties, including pledges to the Green Climate Fund, the Least Developed Countries Fund and the Adaptation Fund, and of international financial institutions, which provide further clarity to and predictability of climate finance flows to 2020;

9. *Also welcomes with appreciation* the 2018 Biennial Assessment and Overview of Climate Finance Flows of the Standing Committee on Finance, in particular its key findings and recommendations highlighting the increase in climate finance flows from developed country Parties to developing country Parties;[[4]](#footnote-5)

10. *Notes* that the dialogue underscored the urgent need to scale up the mobilization of climate finance, including through greater engagement of the private sector, to increase finance for adaptation, and to align financial flows with the objectives of the Paris Agreement and the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals;

11. *Also notes* that the dialogue highlighted the recently initiated replenishment process of the Green Climate Fund as a clear opportunity for enhancing ambition, as well as the importance of transparency and predictability of climate finance, clear eligibility criteria for funding and strong national policy and regulatory frameworks to enhance the mobilization of and access to climate finance;

12. *Further notes* that the President of the Conference of the Parties at its twenty-fourth session will summarize the deliberations of the dialogue for consideration by the Conference of the Parties at its twenty-fifth session (December 2019) in accordance with decision 3/CP.19, paragraph 13;

III. Implementation and ambition

13. *Notes with concern* the current, urgent and emerging needs related to extreme weather events and slow onset events in developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change;

14. *Stresses* the urgency of enhanced ambition in order to ensure the highest possible mitigation and adaptation efforts by all Parties;

15. *Recognizes* the urgent need to enhance the provision of finance, technology and capacity-building support by developed country Parties, in a predictable manner, to enable enhanced action by developing country Parties;

*Pre-2020*

16. *Emphasizes* that enhanced pre-2020 ambition can lay a solid foundation for enhanced post-2020 ambition;

17. *Congratulates* Parties that have accepted the Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol;

18. *Underscores* the urgent need for the entry into force of the Doha Amendment and *urges* Parties to the Kyoto Protocol that have yet to ratify the Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol to deposit their instruments of acceptance with the Depositary as soon as possible;

19. *Welcomes* the 2018 stocktake on pre-2020 implementation and ambition, and *reiterates* its decision[[5]](#footnote-6) to convene another stocktake at its twenty-fifth session;

20. *Urges* developed country Parties to continue to scale up mobilized climate finance, recalling the commitment of developed country Parties in the context of meaningful mitigation actions and transparency on implementation, to a goal of mobilizing jointly USD 100 billion per year by 2020 to address the needs of developing countries, in accordance with decision 1/CP.16;

*Post-2020*

21. *Reiterates* its invitation[[6]](#footnote-7) to Parties to communicate, by 2020, mid-century, long-term low greenhouse gas emission development strategies in accordance with Article 4, paragraph 19, of the Paris Agreement, and *welcomes* the strategies that have already been communicated;

22. *Also reiterates* its request[[7]](#footnote-8) to those Parties whose intended nationally determined contribution pursuant to decision 1/CP.20 contains a time frame up to 2025 to communicate by 2020 a new nationally determined contribution and to do so every five years thereafter pursuant to Article 4, paragraph 9, of the Paris Agreement;

23. *Further reiterates* its request[[8]](#footnote-9) to those Parties whose intended nationally determined contribution pursuant to decision 1/CP.20 contains a time frame up to 2030 to communicate or update by 2020 the contribution and to do so every five years thereafter pursuant to Article 4, paragraph 9, of the Paris Agreement;

IV. Special Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change

24. *Recognizes* the role of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change in providing scientific input to inform Parties in strengthening the global response to the threat of climate change in the context of sustainable development and efforts to eradicate poverty;

25. *Expresses* its appreciation and gratitude to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and the scientific community for responding to the invitation of the Conference of the Parties and providing the Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5 °C,[[9]](#footnote-10) reflecting the best available science;

26. *Welcomes* the timely completion of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5 °C in response to the invitation from Parties in decision 1/CP.21, paragraph 21;

27. *Invites* Parties to make use of the information contained in the report referred to in paragraph 25 above in their discussions under all relevant agenda items of the subsidiary and governing bodies;

28. *Requests* the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice to consider at its fiftieth session (June 2019) the report referred to in paragraph 25 above with a view to strengthening the scientific knowledge on the 1.5 °C goal, including in the context of the preparation of the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and the implementation of the Convention and the Paris Agreement;

29. *Encourages* Parties to continue to support the work of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change;

V. Talanoa Dialogue

30. *Recalls* its decision[[10]](#footnote-11) to convene a facilitative dialogue among Parties in 2018 to take stock of the collective efforts of Parties in relation to progress towards the long-term goal referred to in Article 4, paragraph 1, of the Paris Agreement and to inform the preparation of nationally determined contributions pursuant to Article 4, paragraph 8, of the Paris Agreement;

31. *Expresses* *its appreciation* to the Presidents of the twenty-third and twenty-fourth sessions of the Conference of the Parties for their leadership in the organization, conduct and conclusion of the Talanoa Dialogue;

32. *Also expresses* *its appreciation* to the people of Fiji and the Pacific region for having brought into the UNFCCC process the tradition of Talanoa, whose purpose is to share stories, build empathy and generate trust;

33. *Acknowledges* that the Talanoa Dialogue was an inclusive and participatory process that incentivized exchanges between Parties and non-Party stakeholders following the Pacific tradition of Talanoa;

34. *Also acknowledges* that the Talanoa Dialogue took stock of the collective efforts of Parties in relation to progress towards the long-term goal referred to in Article 4, paragraph 1, of the Paris Agreement and provided information for the preparation of nationally determined contributions pursuant to Article 4, paragraph 8, of the Paris Agreement;

35. *Takes note* of the outcome, inputs and outputs[[11]](#footnote-12) of the Talanoa Dialogue and their potential to generate greater confidence, courage and enhanced ambition;

36. *Recognizes* the efforts and actions that Parties and non-Party stakeholders are undertaking to enhance climate action;

37. *Invites* Parties to consider the outcome, inputs and outputs of the Talanoa Dialogue in preparing their nationally determined contributions and in their efforts to enhance pre-2020 implementation and ambition;

VI. Matters relating to the modalities, procedures and guidelines for the transparency framework for action and support referred to in Article 13 of the Paris Agreement

38. *Decides* that, pursuant to decision 1/CP.21, paragraph 98, for Parties to the Convention that are also Parties to the Paris Agreement, the final biennial reports shall be those that are submitted to the secretariat no later than 31 December 2022, and the final biennial update reports shall be those that are submitted to the secretariat no later than 31 December 2024;

39. *Reaffirms* that, consistently with decision 1/CP.21, paragraph 98, for Parties to the Paris Agreement, following the submission of the final biennial reports and biennial update reports, the modalities, procedures and guidelines contained in the annex to decision 18/CMA.1 will supersede the measurement, reporting and verification system established by decision 1/CP.16, paragraphs 40–47 and 60–64, and decision 2/CP.17, paragraphs 12–62;

40. *Also reaffirms* the reporting obligations under Articles 4 and 12 of the Convention;

41. *Decides* in this context that, for Parties to the Paris Agreement, the biennial transparency reports, technical expert review and facilitative, multilateral consideration of progress prepared and conducted in accordance with the modalities, procedures and guidelines referred to in paragraph 39 above shall replace the biennial reports, biennial update reports, international assessment and review, and international consultation and analysis referred to in decision 2/CP.17;

42. *Also decides* that, to fulfil national inventory reporting obligations under the Convention, Parties to the Paris Agreement submitting annual national inventory reports under the Convention shall use the modalities, procedures and guidelines for national inventory reports contained in chapter II of the annex to decision 18/CMA.1 by the date that the reports are first due under the Paris Agreement, with the technical expert review to be conducted in accordance with the corresponding modalities, procedures and guidelines contained in chapter VII of the annex to decision 18/CMA.1, in place of the greenhouse gas inventory reporting guidelines contained in the annex to decision 24/CP.19 and the review guidelines in the annex to decision 13/CP.20, respectively, including in years in which a biennial transparency report is not due under the Paris Agreement;

43. *Further decides* that, with respect to the reporting and review of national communications under the Convention every four years, starting from the date that reports are first due under the Paris Agreement:

(a) Parties may submit their national communication and biennial transparency report as a single report in accordance with the modalities, procedures and guidelines included in the annex to decision 18/CMA.1 for information also covered by the national communication reporting guidelines contained in, as applicable, decisions 4/CP.5 and 17/CP.8;

(b) In addition, Parties shall include in the report:

(i) Supplemental chapters on research and systematic observation and on education, training and public awareness, in accordance with the guidelines contained in, as applicable, decisions 4/CP.5 and 17/CP.8;

(ii) For those Parties that have not reported under chapter IV of the annex to decision 18/CMA.1, an additional chapter on adaptation, in accordance with the relevant guidelines contained in, as applicable, decisions 4/CP.5 and 17/CP.8;

(c) For those Parties whose national communications are subject to review under decision 13/CP.20, the review shall be conducted in accordance with the relevant guidelines contained in chapter VII of the annex to decision 18/CMA.1, and shall also include a review of the information submitted under paragraph 43(b) above, in accordance with relevant guidance in decision 13/CP.20, as applicable;

44. *Reiterates* that for Parties to the Convention that are not Parties to the Paris Agreement, reporting obligations under Articles 4 and 12 of the Convention and existing measurement, reporting and verification arrangements under the Convention shall continue to apply, in accordance with relevant decisions, as applicable, and *decides* that, to enhance comparability of information, those Parties may use the modalities, procedures and guidelines contained in the annex to decision 18/CMA.1, as well as the information referred to in paragraph 43(b) above with respect to national communications, to meet their reporting commitments under Articles 4 and 12 of the Convention, in lieu of guidance adopted under the Convention;

45. *Decides* that the technical annex referred to in decision 14/CP.19, paragraph 7, containing modalities for measuring, reporting and verifying the activities referred to in decision 1/CP.16, paragraph 70, shall be submitted as an annex to the biennial transparency report;

46. *Also decides* that the technical analysis referred to in decision 14/CP.19, paragraph 11, containing modalities for measuring, reporting and verifying the activities referred to in decision 1/CP.16, paragraph 70, shall be carried out concurrently with the technical expert review under Article 13 of the Paris Agreement;

VII. Leaders’ Summit

47. *Welcomes* the participation of Heads of State and Government in the Leaders’ Summit convened in Katowice on 3 December 2018;

48. *Notes* the Solidarity and Just Transition Silesia Declaration,[[12]](#footnote-13) which recognizes the need to take into account the imperatives of a just transition of the workforce and the creation of decent work and quality jobs;

VIII. United Nations Climate Summit 2019

49. *Welcomes* the initiative of the United Nations Secretary-General to convene the 2019 Climate Summit;

50. *Calls on* Parties to participate in the Summit and to demonstrate, through such participation, their enhanced ambition in addressing climate change;

IX. Administrative and budgetary matters

51. *Takes note* of the estimated budgetary implications of the activities to be undertaken by the secretariat referred to in this decision;

52. *Requests* that the actions of the secretariat called for in this decision be undertaken subject to the availability of financial resources.

*9th plenary meeting*

*15 December 2018*

Decision 2/CP.24

Local Communities and Indigenous Peoples Platform

*The Conference of the Parties*,

*Recalling* the Charter of the United Nations and United Nations General Assembly resolution 66/288,

*Also recalling* the Paris Agreement,decision 1/CP.21 and decision 2/CP.23,

*Emphasizing* that the purpose and functions of the Local Communities and Indigenous Peoples Platform and its Facilitative Working Group will be carried out consistent with international law,

*Also emphasizing*,in its entirety, the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in the context of the implementation of the functions of the Local Communities and Indigenous Peoples Platform involving indigenous peoples,

*Further emphasizing* that in the context of the implementation of the functions of the Local Communities and Indigenous Peoples Platform involving local communities, none of the activities should authorize or encourage any action, which will dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent States,

1.  *Decides* to establishthe Local Communities and Indigenous Peoples Platform Facilitative Working Group;

2. *Affirms* that the Facilitative Working Group is established with the objective of further operationalizing the Local Communities and Indigenous Peoples Platform and facilitating the implementation of its functions;

3. *Decides* that the Facilitative Working Group shall comprise 14 representatives, as follows:

(a) One representative of a Party from each of the five United Nations regional groups;

(b) One representative of a Party from a small island developing State;

(c) One representative of a least developed country Party;

(d) Seven representatives from indigenous peoples organizations, one from each of the seven United Nations indigenous sociocultural regions;

4. *Requests* the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice to consider, in the context of the review referred to in paragraph 27 below, and taking into account progress related to the representation of local communities, the addition of at least three additional representatives to represent local communities, as well as a process for the appointment of such representatives, and an equal number of Party representatives, with a view to recommending a draft decision on the representation of local communities on the Local Communities and Indigenous Peoples Platform for consideration and adoption by the Conference of the Parties at its twenty-seventh session (November 2021);

5. *Decides* that Party representatives shall be appointed by their respective regional groups and constituencies, and that the Chair of the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice shall be notified of these appointments;

6. *Also decides* that indigenous peoples representatives shall be appointed by the indigenous peoples, through their focal points, and that the Chair of the Subsidiary Body of Scientific Technological Advice shall be notified of these appointments;

7. *Further decides* that, along with each representative, one alternate may be designated, in accordance with the appointment process referred to in paragraphs 3–6 above; the alternate representative will participate in meetings when the representative is unable to attend, and will replace the representative for the remainder of the term if the representative cannot complete the functions of the assigned office;

8. *Decides* that representatives of the Facilitative Working Group shall serve for a term of three years and shall not be eligible to serve two consecutive terms, and that the representatives shall remain in office until their successors have been elected;

9. *Also decides* that the Facilitative Working Group shall elect annually two co-chairs and two vice co-chairs from among its representatives to serve for a term of one year each, with one co-chair and one vice co-chair being a representative from a Party and the other co‑chair and vice co-chair being a representative from indigenous peoples and, as appropriate, local communities;

10. *Further decides* that the election and rotation of the co-chairs and vice co-chairs will take into account regional geographic balance, and strive for gender balance;

11. *Decides* that if one of the co-chairs is temporarily unable to fulfil the obligations of the office, the respective vice co-chair shall serve as the co-chair;

12. *Also decides* that if one of the co-chairs or vice co-chairs is unable to complete the term of office, the Facilitative Working Group shall elect a replacement to complete that term of office, in accordance with paragraphs 9 and 10 above;

13. *Invites* Parties to promote the engagement of local communities in the Local Communities and Indigenous Peoples Platform with a view to enhancing their participation in the Facilitative Working Group and the Platform;

14. *Stresses* the importance of striving for gender balance in the appointment processes of representatives in accordance with decisions 36/CP.7, 23/CP.18 and 3/CP.23;

15. *Decides* that the Facilitative Working Group shall operate on the basis of consensus;

16. *Invites* Parties, local communities and indigenous peoples to take into consideration the Local Communities and Indigenous Peoples Platform and its functions at the local, national and regional level in order to enhance the engagement and inclusion of indigenous peoples and local communities to facilitate the exchange of experience and the sharing of best practices and lessons learned on mitigation and adaptation in a holistic and integrated manner;

17. *Decides* that the Facilitative Working Group shall meet twice per year in conjunction with the sessions of the subsidiary bodies and the session of the Conference of the Parties;

18. *Also decides* that the Facilitative Working Group, under the incremental approach, will propose an initial two-year workplan for the period 2020–2021 for implementing the functions of the Local Communities and Indigenous Peoples Platform for consideration by the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice at its fifty-first session (December 2019);

19. *Further decides* that the workplan referred to in paragraph 18 above should take into account experiences from any activities that have already taken place under the Local Communities and Indigenous Peoples Platform, and that the workplan may include annual in-session events in conjunction with the sessions of the Conference of the Parties and the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice, on which summary reports, which could be of a technical nature, would be prepared by the Facilitative Working Group;

20. *Encourages* the Facilitative Working Group to collaborate with other bodies under and outside the Convention, as appropriate, aiming at enhancing the coherence of the actions of the Local Communities and Indigenous Peoples Platform under the Convention;

21. *Requests* the secretariat, with the support of the Facilitative Working Group, to make the work of the Local Communities and Indigenous Peoples Platform widely accessible, including through the development of a dedicated web portal on the Local Communities and Indigenous Peoples Platform on the UNFCCC website;

22. *Also requests* the secretariat to organize a thematic in-session workshop, in conjunction with the fiftieth session (June 2019) of the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice, on enhancing the participation of local communities, in addition to indigenous peoples, in the Local Communities and Indigenous Peoples Platform;

23. *Further requests* the secretariat to develop, under the incremental approach for the operationalization of the Local Communities and Indigenous Peoples Platform, activities related to the implementation of all three functions of the Platform,[[13]](#footnote-14) at each session of the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice until the workplan is adopted, and *invites* Parties, observers and other stakeholders to submit their views on possible activities via the submission portal[[14]](#footnote-15) by 28 February 2019;

24. *Requests* the Facilitative Working Group to report on its outcomes, including a draft second three-year workplan, and on the activities of the Local Communities and Indigenous Peoples Platform, for consideration by the Conference of the Parties at its twenty-seventh session through the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice at its fifty-fourth session (May–June 2021);

25. *Decides* to endorse the draft workplan referred to in paragraph 24 above at its twenty-seventh session;

26. *Requests* the secretariat to make the reports referred to in paragraph 24 above publicly available on the UNFCCC website;

27. *Decides* that the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice will review the outcomes and activities of the Facilitative Working Group, taking into account the reports referred to in paragraph 24 above, at its fifty-fourth session and make recommendations to the Conference of the Parties at its twenty-seventh session with a view to the Conference of the Parties adopting a decision on the outcome of this review;

28. *Also decides* that the initial mandate for the Facilitative Working Group will span three years, to be extended as determined by the review referred to in paragraph 27 above;

29. *Further decides* that the meetings of the Facilitative Working Group shall be open to Parties and observers under the Convention;

30. *Requests* the secretariat to support and facilitate the work of the Facilitative Working Group;

31. *Takes note of* the estimated budgetary implications of the activities to be undertaken by the secretariat referred to in paragraph 30 above;

32. *Requests* that the actions of the secretariat called for in this decision be undertaken subject to the availability of financial resources;

33. *Invites* interested Parties and organizations to provide financial and technical support, as appropriate, for the implementation of the functions of the Local Communities and Indigenous Peoples Platform.

*7th plenary meeting*

*13 December 2018*

Decision 3/CP.24

Long-term climate finance

*The Conference of the Parties*,

*Recalling* Articles 4 and 11 of the Convention,

*Also recalling* decision 1/CP.16, paragraphs 2, 4 and 97–101, as well as decisions 1/CP.17, 2/CP.17, paragraphs 126–132, 4/CP.18, 3/CP.19, 5/CP.20, 5/CP.21, 7/CP.22 and 6/CP.23,

1. *Welcomes with appreciation* the 2018 Biennial Assessment and Overview of Climate Finance Flows of the Standing Committee on Finance, in particular its key findings and recommendations highlighting the increase in climate finance flows from developed country Parties to developing country Parties;[[15]](#footnote-16)

2. *Also welcomes* *with appreciation* the continued progress of developed country Parties towards reaching the goal of mobilizing jointly USD 100 billion annually by 2020, in the context of meaningful mitigation action and transparency on implementation, in accordance with decision 1/CP.16;

3. *Recalls* the commitment of developed country Parties, in the context of meaningful mitigation action and transparency on implementation, to a goal of mobilizing jointly USD 100 billion per year by 2020 to address the needs of developing country Parties in accordance with decision 1/CP.16, and *urges* developed country Parties to continue to scale up mobilized climate finance towards achieving this goal;

4. *Urges* developed country Parties to continue their efforts to channel a substantial share of public climate funds to adaptation activities and to strive to achieve a greater balance between finance for mitigation and for adaptation, recognizing the importance of adaptation finance and the need for public and grant-based resources for adaptation;

5. *Welcomes* the biennial submissions received to date from developed country Parties on their strategies and approaches for scaling up climate finance from 2018 to 2020 in accordance with decision 3/CP.19, paragraph 10,[[16]](#footnote-17) and *urges* those developed country Parties that have not yet done so to submit this information;

6. *Requests* the secretariat, in line with decision 5/CP.20, paragraph 11, to prepare a compilation and synthesis of the biennial submissions referred to in paragraph 5 above in order to inform the in-session workshops referred to in paragraph 9 below;

7. *Welcomes* the progress of Parties’ efforts to strengthen their domestic enabling environments in order to attract climate finance, and *requests* Parties to continue to enhance their enabling environments and policy frameworks to facilitate the mobilization and effective deployment of climate finance in accordance with decision 3/CP.19;

8. *Notes with appreciation* the summary report[[17]](#footnote-18) on the 2018 in-session workshop on long-term climate finance, and *invites* Parties and relevant institutions to consider the key messages therein;

9. *Decides* that the in-session workshops on long-term climate finance in 2019 and 2020 will focus on:

(a) The effectiveness of climate finance, including the results and impacts of finance provided and mobilized;

(b) The provision of financial and technical support to developing country Parties for their adaptation and mitigation actions in relation to holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2 ºC above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 ºC above pre-industrial levels;

10. *Requests* the secretariat to organize the in-session workshops referred to in paragraph 9 above and to prepare summary reports on the workshops for consideration by the Conference of the Parties at its twenty-fifth session (December 2019) and twenty-sixth session (November 2020) respectively;

11. *Also requests* the secretariat to continue to ensure that the workshops are well-balanced by, inter alia, inviting both public and private sector actors to attend them and summarizing the views expressed at the workshops in a fair and gender-balanced manner;

12. *Welcomes* the third biennial high-level ministerial dialogue on climate finance, convened in accordance with decision 3/CP.19, and *looks forward* to the summary of the Presidency of the Conference of the Parties of the deliberations of the dialogue for consideration by the Conference of the Parties at its twenty-fifth session;[[18]](#footnote-19)

13. *Decides* that the fourth biennial high-level ministerial dialogue on climate finance, to be convened in 2020 in accordance with decision 3/CP.19, will be informed by the reports on the in-session workshops on long-term climate finance and the 2020 Biennial Assessment and Overview of Climate Finance Flows.

*10th plenary meeting*

*15 December 2018*

Decision 4/CP.24

Report of the Standing Committee on Finance

*The Conference of the Parties*,

*Recalling* Articles 4 and 11 of the Convention,

*Also recalling* decisions 1/CP.16, paragraph 112, and 2/CP.17, paragraphs 120 and 121, as well as decisions 5/CP.18, 7/CP.19, 6/CP.20, 6/CP.21, 8/CP.22 and 7/CP.23,

1. Welcomes with appreciation the report of the Standing Committee on Finance to the Conference of the Parties at its twenty-fourth session, taking note of the recommendations contained therein;[[19]](#footnote-20)

2. *Endorses* the workplan of the Standing Committee on Finance for 2019;[[20]](#footnote-21)

3. *Welcomes with appreciation* the 2018 Biennial Assessment and Overview of Climate Finance Flows of the Standing Committee on Finance,[[21]](#footnote-22) in particular the summary and recommendations as contained in the annex;

4. *Encourages* the Standing Committee on Finance to take into account the best available science in future biennial assessments and overviews of climate finance flows;

5. *Requests* the Standing Committee on Finance to use in the biennial assessment and overview of climate finance flows the established terminology in the provisions of the Convention and the Paris Agreement in relation to climate finance, where applicable;

6. *Expresses its appreciation* for the financial contributions provided by the Governments of Belgium, Germany, Norway, the Republic of Korea, Switzerland and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, as well as by the European Commission to support the work of the Standing Committee on Finance;

7. *Welcomes* the 2018 Forum of the Standing Committee on Finance on the topic of climate finance architecture with a focus on enhancing collaboration and seizing opportunities, and takes note of the summary report[[22]](#footnote-23) on the Forum;

8. *Expresses its gratitude* to the Governments of the Netherlands, Norway and the Republic of Korea for their support in ensuring the success of the 2018 Forum of the Standing Committee on Finance;

9. *Welcomes* the decision of the Standing Committee on Finance on the topic of its 2019 Forum, which will be climate finance and sustainable cities;

10. *Requests* the Standing Committee on Finance to map, every four years, as part of its biennial assessment and overview of climate finance flows, the available information relevant to Article 2, paragraph 1(c), of the Paris Agreement, including its reference to Article 9 thereof;

11. *Encourages* the Standing Committee on Finance to provide input to the technical paper of the Executive Committee of the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage associated with Climate Change Impacts on the sources of financial support;[[23]](#footnote-24)

12. *Confirms* the mandates in Article 11, paragraph 3(d), of the Convention, and decisions 12/CP.2, 12/CP.3, 5/CP.19 and 1/CP.21;

13. *Requests* the Standing Committee on Finance to prepare, every four years, a report on the determination of the needs of developing country Parties related to implementing the Convention and the Paris Agreement, for consideration by the Conference of Parties, starting at its twenty-sixth session (November 2020), and the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement, starting at its third session (November 2020);

14. *Also* *requests* the Standing Committee on Finance, in preparing the report referred to in paragraph 13 above, to collaborate, as appropriate, with the operating entities of the Financial Mechanism, the subsidiary and constituted bodies, multilateral and bilateral channels, and observer organizations;

15. *Further requests* that the actions of the Standing Committee on Finance called for in this decision be undertaken subject to the availability of financial resources;

16. *Requests* the Standing Committee on Finance to report to the Conference of the Parties at its twenty-fifth session (December 2019) on progress in implementing its workplan;

17. *Also requests* the Standing Committee on Finance to consider the guidance provided to it in other relevant decisions of the Conference of the Parties.

Annex

Summary and recommendations by the Standing Committee on Finance on the 2018 Biennial Assessment and Overview of Climate Finance Flows

[English only]

I. Context and mandates

1. The Standing Committee on Finance (SCF) assists the Conference of the Parties (COP) in exercising its functions with respect to the Financial Mechanism of the Convention, inter alia, in terms of measurement, reporting and verification of support provided to developing country Parties, through activities such as the biennial assessment and overview of climate finance flows (BA).[[24]](#footnote-25)

2. Subsequent to the 2014 BA, the COP requested the SCF to consider: the relevant work of other bodies and entities on measurement, reporting and verification of support and the tracking of climate finance;[[25]](#footnote-26) ways of strengthening methodologies for reporting climate finance;[[26]](#footnote-27) and ongoing technical work on operational definitions of climate finance, including private finance mobilized by public interventions, to assess how adaptation and mitigation needs can most effectively be met by climate finance.[[27]](#footnote-28) It also requested the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement, when developing the modalities, procedures and guidelines for the transparency framework for action and support, to consider, inter alia, information in the BA and other reports of the SCF and other relevant bodies under the Convention.

3. The COP welcomed the summary and recommendations by the SCF on the 2016 BA, which, inter alia, encourages Parties and relevant international institutions to enhance the availability of information that will be necessary for tracking global progress on the goals outlined in Article 2 of the Paris Agreement. The COP requested the SCF, in preparing future BAs, to assess available information on investment needs and plans related to Parties’ nationally determined contributions (NDCs) and national adaptation plans.

4. The 2018 BA provides an updated overview of climate finance flows in 2015 and 2016 from provider to beneficiary countries, available information on domestic climate finance and cooperation among Parties not included in Annex I to the Convention (non-Annex I Parties), and the other climate-related flows that constitute global total climate finance flows. It also includes information on trends since the 2014 BA. The 2018 BA then considers the implications of these flows and assesses their relevance to international efforts to address climate change. It explores the key features of climate finance flows, including composition and purposes. It also explores emerging insights into their effectiveness, finance access, and ownership and alignment of climate finance with beneficiary country needs and priorities related to climate change. It also provides information on recent developments in the measurement, reporting and verification of climate finance flows at the international and domestic level, and insights into impact reporting practices.

5. The 2018 BA includes, for the first time, information relevant to Article 2, paragraph 1(c), of the Paris Agreement, including methods and metrics, and data sets on flows, stocks and considerations for integration. It also discusses climate finance flows in the broader context.

6. The 2018 BA comprises this summary and recommendations, and a technical report. The summary and recommendations was prepared by the SCF. The technical report was prepared by experts under the guidance of the SCF and draws on information and data from a range of sources. It was subject to extensive stakeholder input and expert review, but remains a product of the external experts.

II. Challenges and limitations

7. The 2018 BA provides an updated overview of current climate finance flows over the years 2015 and 2016, along with data on trends from 2011 to 2014 collated in previous BA reports. Due diligence has been undertaken to utilize the best information available from the most credible sources. In compiling estimates, efforts have been made to avoid double counting through a focus on primary finance, which is finance for a new physical item or activity. Challenges were nevertheless encountered in collecting, aggregating and analysing information from diverse sources. The lack of clarity with regard to the use of different definitions of climate finance limits the comparability of data.

8. **Data uncertainty.** There are uncertainties associated with each source of data which have different underlying causes. Uncertainties are related to the data on domestic public investments, resulting from the lack of geographic coverage, differences in the way methods are applied, significant changes in the methods for estimating energy efficiency over the years, and the lack of available data on sustainable transport and other key sectors. Uncertainties also arise from the lack of procedures and data to determine private climate finance; methods for estimating adaptation finance; differences in the assumptions of underlying formulas to attribute finance from multilateral development banks (MDBs) to members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC), minus the Republic of Korea; the classification of data as ‘green finance’; and incomplete data on non-concessional flows.

9. **Data gaps.** Gaps in the coverage of sectors and sources of climate finance remain significant, particularly with regard to private investment. Although estimates of incremental investments in energy efficiency have improved, there is still an inadequate understanding of the public and private sources of finance and the financial instruments behind those investments. For sustainable transport, efforts have been made to improve public and private investment in electric vehicles. However, information on sources and instruments for finance in public mass transit remains unreported in many countries. High-quality data on private investments in mitigation and finance in sectors such as agriculture, forests, water and waste management are particularly lacking. In particular, adaptation finance estimates are difficult to compare with mitigation finance estimates due to the former being context-specific and incremental, and more work is needed on estimating climate-resilient investments.

10. The limitations outlined in paragraphs 8 and 9 above need to be taken into consideration when deriving conclusions and policy implications from the 2018 BA. The SCF will contribute, through its activities, to the progressive improvement of the measurement, reporting and verification of climate finance information in future BAs to help address these challenges.

III. Key findings

A. Methodological issues relating to measurement, reporting and verification of public and private climate finance

1. Developments in the period 2015–2016

11. Following the recommendations made by the SCF in the 2016 BA, the 2018 BA identifies the improvements listed in paragraphs 12–16 below in the tracking and reporting of information on climate finance.

**(a) Annex II Parties**

12. Revision of the biennial report (BR) common tabular format (CTF) tables 7, 7(a) and 7(b) has facilitated the provision of more qualitative information on the definitions and underlying methodologies used by Parties included in Annex II to the Convention (Annex II Parties) in the documentation boxes in the BR3 CTF tables. The BR3 CTF tables submitted as at October 2018 suggest some increase in the provision of quantitative information, including information on public financial support in CTF table 7(b) and climate-related private finance in the BRs.

**(b) International organizations**

13. Making data available on private shares of climate co-finance associated with MDB finance and reporting on amounts mobilized through public interventions deployed by other development finance institutions (DFIs) included in the regular OECD-DAC data collection process.

14. Facilitating the increased transparency of information through biennial surveys to collect information from OECD-DAC members on the measurement basis for reporting (i.e. committed, disbursed or “other”), and on the shares of the activity reported as mitigation, adaptation or cross-cutting to the UNFCCC.

15. Institutionalizing the mitigation and adaptation finance tracking and reporting, and ongoing efforts aimed at better tracking and reporting on projects that have mitigation and adaptation co-benefits (i.e. cross-cutting) among MDBs.

16. Measuring and reporting on impact is now common practice among multilateral climate funds, and there is now growing interest in this field by MDBs and the International Development Finance Club (IDFC), which are also undertaking work on methodologies for impact measuring in the light of the Paris Agreement. The ongoing efforts of MDBs to develop additional metrics that demonstrate how MDB financing supports climate-resilient development pathways are an important step in this direction.

**(c) Insights into reporting by Annex II Parties and non-Annex I Parties**

17. Notwithstanding the improvements in methodologies for reporting climate finance via the BR3 CTF tables 7, 7(a) and 7(b), some reporting issues persist that complicate the aggregation, comparison and analysis of the data. The current “UNFCCC biennial reporting guidelines for developed country Parties”[[28]](#footnote-29) were designed to accommodate reporting on a wide range of climate finance instruments and activities. This required a reporting architecture that was flexible enough to accommodate a diversity of reporting approaches. In some cases, limited clarity with regard to the diversity of reporting approaches limits comparability in climate finance reporting.

18. The current “UNFCCC biennial update reporting guidelines for Parties not included in Annex I to the Convention”[[29]](#footnote-30) for reporting by non-Annex I Parties on financial, technical and capacity-building needs and support received do not require information on underlying assumptions, definitions and methodologies used in generating the information. Nevertheless, the provision of such information is useful.

**(d) Insights into broader reporting aspects**

19. Notwithstanding ongoing efforts to make information on domestic climate-related finance available through biennial update reports (BURs), published climate public expenditure and institutional reviews, and other tools, collecting and reporting domestic climate-related finance is often not undertaken systematically, thereby limiting the availability of information.

20. There are significant data gaps on climate finance flows in the context of cooperation among non-Annex I Parties.

2. Information relevant to Article 2, paragraph 1(c), of the Paris Agreement: methods and metrics

21. Ongoing voluntary efforts to develop approaches for tracking and reporting on consistency of public and private sector finance with the Paris Agreement are important for enhancing the collective understanding of the consistency of the broader finance and investment flows with Article 2, paragraph 1(c), of the Paris Agreement.

22. Some financial actors, such as MDBs and bilateral DFIs, have started to develop approaches for tracking the integration of climate change considerations into their operations. However, there was no publicly available information on the progress made on this matter at the time of preparation of the 2018 BA. Ongoing work for developing climate-resilience metrics is important for enhancing understanding of the consistency of multilateral and bilateral development finance with the Paris Agreement.

B. Overview of current climate finance flows in the period 2015–2016

1. Global finance flows

23. On a comparable basis, climate finance flows increased by 17 per cent in the period 2015–2016 compared with the period 2013–2014. High-bound climate finance estimates increased from USD 584 billion in 2014 to USD 680 billion in 2015 and to USD 681 billion in 2016 (see figure 1). The growth seen in 2015 was largely driven by high levels of new private investment in renewable energy, which is the largest segment of the global total. Despite decreasing technology costs (particularly in solar photovoltaic and wind power generation), which means that every dollar invested finances more renewable energy than it previously did, a significant number of new projects were financed in 2015. In 2016, a decrease in renewable energy investment occurred, which was driven by both the continued decline in renewable technology costs and the lower generation capacity of new projects financed.[[30]](#footnote-31) However, the decrease in renewable energy investment in 2016 was offset by an 8 per cent increase in investment in energy efficiency technologies across the building, industry and transport sectors.

24. The quality and completeness of data on climate finance has improved since the 2016 BA. Methodological improvements in estimating finance flows have changed the comparative basis against previous estimates. In particular, 2014 estimates for energy efficiency have been revised downward owing to a more accurate bottom-up assessment model being employed by the International Energy Agency. This has resulted in a revised estimate of USD 584 billion from USD 741 billion for total global climate finance in 2014. In addition, data coverage in sustainable transport has improved, with estimates for public and private investment in electric vehicle sales in 2015 and 2016.

**(a) Flows from Annex II Parties to non-Annex I Parties as reported in biennial reports**

25. Climate-specific finance reported in BRs submitted by Annex II Parties has increased in terms of both volume and rate of growth since the previous BA. Whereas the total finance reported increased by just 5 per cent from 2013 to 2014, it increased by 24 per cent from 2014 to 2015 (to USD 33 billion), and subsequently by 14 per cent from 2015 to 2016 (to USD 38 billion). Out of these total amounts, USD 30 billion in 2015 and USD 34 billion in 2016 were reported as climate-specific finance channelled through bilateral, regional and other channels; the remainder flowed through multilateral channels. From 2014 to 2016, both mitigation and adaptation finance grew in more or less equal proportions, namely by 41 and 45 per cent, respectively.

**(b) Multilateral climate funds**

26. Total amounts channelled through UNFCCC funds and multilateral climate funds in 2015 and 2016 were USD 1.4 billion and USD 2.4 billion, respectively. The significant increase from 2015 to 2016 was a result of the Green Climate Fund (GCF) ramping up operations. On the whole, this represents a decrease of approximately 13 per cent compared with the 2013–2014 biennium and can be accounted for by a reduction in the commitments made by the Climate Investment Funds, in line with changes in the climate finance landscape as the GCF only started to scale up operations in 2016.

**(c) Climate finance from multilateral development banks**

27. MDBs provided USD 23.4 billion and USD 25.5 billion in climate finance from their own resources to eligible recipient countries in 2015 and 2016, respectively. On average, this represents a 3.4 per cent increase from the 2013–2014 period.

28. The attribution of MDB finance flows to members of OECD-DAC, minus the Republic of Korea, is calculated at up to USD 17.4 billion in 2015 and USD 19.7 billion in 2016 to recipients eligible for OECD-DAC official development assistance.

**(d) Private climate finance**

29. The most significant source of uncertainty relates to the geographic attribution of private finance data. Although efforts have been made by MDBs and OECD since the 2016 BA to estimate private climate finance mobilized through multilateral and bilateral institutions, data on private finance sources and destinations remain lacking.

30. MDBs reported private finance mobilization in 2015 was USD 10.9 billion and increased by 43 per cent the following year to USD 15.7 billion. OECD estimated USD 21.7 billion in climate-related private finance mobilized during the period 2012–2015 by bilateral and multilateral institutions, which included USD 14 billion from multilateral providers and USD 7.7 billion from bilateral finance institutions. It is estimated that, in 2015, USD 2.3 billion was mobilized through bilateral institutions. The Climate Policy Initiative estimated renewable energy flows for new projects ranged from USD 2.4 billion in 2015 to USD 1.5 billion in 2016; this was, however, a significant underestimation given the underlying reporting approaches.

**(e) Recipients**

31. A total of 34 Parties included in Annex I to the Convention provided information on recipients in the BR3s, while 16 out of 40 BURs submitted as first or second BURs as at October 2018 include, to varying degrees, quantitative information on climate finance received in the 2015–2016 period. Therefore, at the time of the preparation of the 2018 BA, it is not possible to present a clear picture of climate finance received on the basis of the information included in national reports submitted to the secretariat.

32. Other sources of information provide insights on recipients. For example, of the bilateral finance reported to OECD-DAC, national and local governments received 51 and 61 per cent of bilateral climate-related assistance in 2015 and 2016, up from 43 and 42 per cent in 2013 and 2014, respectively. The remainder was received by international organizations, non-governmental organizations and public and private sector organizations from the support-providing countries. No information is available on the channels of delivery for 91–97 per cent of the other official flows of a non-concessional nature in the period 2015–2016. Of the total climate finance committed by MDBs from their own resources, 72 per cent was channelled to public sector recipients in 2015, and 74 per cent in 2016. Adaptation finance, in particular, went predominantly to public sector institutions: 90 per cent in 2015 and 97 per cent in 2016.

2. Domestic climate finance

33. Domestic climate expenditures by national and subnational governments are a potentially growing source of global climate finance, particularly as, in some cases, NDC submissions are translated into specific investment plans and domestic efforts to monitor and track the domestic climate expenditures are stepped up. However, comprehensive data on domestic climate expenditure are not readily available, as these data are not collected regularly or with a consistent methodology over time within or across countries. Of the 30 countries that reported data on climate expenditures included in the 2016 BA, 19 countries provided such data in 2015 or 2016, with the 2015 data for 5 countries being included in the 2016 BA. Four countries reported expenditure of USD 0.335 billion in their BURs, while seven countries published climate public expenditure and institutional reviews amounting to USD 16.5 billion.[[31]](#footnote-32) In two other countries, updated data are available amounting to USD 49 billion. In total, this brings domestic public climate finance estimates for the period 2015–2016 to USD 67 billion.



3. Flows among countries that are not members of the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, recipients eligible for official development assistance and Parties not included in Annex I

34. Information on climate finance flows among non-Annex I Parties is not systematically tracked, relying on voluntary reporting by countries through the OECD-DAC Creditor Reporting System and DFIs through IDFC that are based in countries that are not members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (non-OECD). Total estimates of such flows amounted to USD 12.2–13.9 billion in 2015 and USD 11.3–13.7 billion in 2016. This represents an increase of approximately 33 per cent on average from the 2013–2014 period, driven primarily by non-OECD member institutions of IDFC increasing finance significantly to other non-OECD members. New multilateral institutions include the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the New Development Bank. Together, they provided USD 911 million to renewable energy projects in 2016. The AIIB portion of this amount included outflows that may be attributable to OECD-DAC members that are shareholders in AIIB.

Figure 1

**Climate finance flows in the period 2015–2016**

(Billions of United States dollars, annualized)



*Abbreviations*:BEV = battery electric vehicle, BUR = biennial update report, CPEIR = climate public expenditure and institutional reviews, CPI = Climate Policy Initiative, IEA = International Energy Agency, I4CE = Institute for Climate Economics, MDB = multilateral development bank, OECD = Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, UNDP = United Nations Development Programme.

*a* Value discounts transport energy efficiency estimates by 8.5 per cent to account for overlap with electric vehicle estimates.

*b* From members of the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC), minus the Republic of Korea, to OECD-DAC recipients eligible for official development assistance. Refer to chapter 2.5.2 of the 2018 Biennial Assessment and Overview of Climate Finance Flows technical report for further explanation.

*c* Estimates include private co-financing with MDB finance.

4. Information relevant to Article 2, paragraph 1(c), of the Paris Agreement: data sets on flows, stocks and integration

35. The 2018 BA includes information on available data sets that integrate climate change considerations into insurance, lending and investment decision-making processes and that include information that may be relevant to tracking consistency with Article 2, paragraph 1(c), of the Paris Agreement.


36. Across the financial sector, both the reporting of data on financial flows and stocks consistent with low greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and climate-resilient pathways, and the integration of climate considerations into decision-making are at a nascent stage. The data sets available on bond markets are the most advanced, with regular and reliable data published based on green bond labelling and analysis of bonds that may be aligned with climate themes. Less information is available on bonds that may be inconsistent with low GHG emissions and climate-resilient pathways. Other market segments lack completeness of coverage and reporting quality across peer institutions. With regard to integrating climate change considerations into investment decision-making, some market segments such as listed corporations and institutional investors are participating in emerging reporting initiatives, including through target-setting processes, that will likely improve the availability of data over time. Other market segments such as insurance companies participate in comprehensive and regular survey reporting on climate integration into governance and risk-management processes. Other market segments, particularly in banking, insurance and financial services, lack breadth of coverage in reporting or are at an early stage of considering how to report data.

C. Assessment of climate finance flows

37. An assessment of the data underlying the overview of climate finance flows presented offers insights into crucial questions of interest in the context of the objective of the Convention and the goals outlined in the Paris Agreement. Development banks, DFIs and multilateral climate funds play a vital role in helping countries to deliver on their NDCs. The key features of a subset of these different channels of public climate finance for beneficiary countries are summarized in the figure below, including the areas of support (adaptation, mitigation or cross-cutting) and the instruments used to deliver climate finance.

Figure 2

**Characteristics of international public climate finance flows in the period 2015–2016**



*Note*: All values are based on approvals and commitments.

*Abbreviations*: MDB = multilateral development bank.

*a* In decision 1/CP.16, paragraph 70, the Conference of the Parties encouraged developing country Parties to contribute to mitigation actions in the forest sector by undertaking the following activities: reducing emissions from deforestation; reducing emissions from forest degradation; conservation of forest carbon stocks; sustainable management of forests; and enhancement of forest carbon stocks.

*b* Including Adaptation for Smallholder Agriculture Programme, Adaptation Fund, Bio Carbon Fund, Clean Technology Fund, Forest Carbon Partnership Facility, Forest Investment Program, Global Climate Change Alliance, Global Environment Facility Trust Fund, Green Climate Fund, Least Developed Countries Fund, Partnership for Market Readiness, Pilot Programme for Climate Resilience, Scaling Up Renewable Energy Program, Special Climate Change Fund and United Nations Collaborative Programme on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing Countries.

*c* Bilateral climate finance data are sourced from biennial reports from Parties included in Annex II to the Convention (that further include regional and other channels) for the annual average. Information related to the United States of America is drawn from preliminary data provided by the United States. The thematic split and the financial instrument data are taken from data from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC), referring only to concessional flows of climate-related development assistance reported by OECD-DAC members. Section C of the summary and recommendations and chapter III of the technical report uses ‘bilateral finance’ to refer only to concessional flows of climate-related development assistance reported by OECD-DAC members.

*d* The annual average and thematic split of MDBs includes their own resources only, while the financial instrument data include data from MDBs and from external resources, due to the lack of data disaggregation.

38. Overall, trends in climate finance point to increasing flows towards beneficiary countries. Bilateral climate finance flows, and those channelled through MDBs, have increased since the 2016 BA, whereas flows from the multilateral climate funds have fluctuated, having decreased in 2015 before rebounding in 2016, although the average remains lower than in the 2013–2014 period, which reflects changes in the climate finance landscape.

39. When considering these flows in aggregate, support for mitigation remains greater than support for adaptation across all sources (noting, however, measurement differences). Bilateral finance flows from OECD-DAC providers had the greatest proportion intended for adaptation (29 per cent) in the period 2015–2016, followed by multilateral climate funds (25 per cent) and MDBs (21 per cent). However, the 2018 BA finds an increase in public climate finance flows that contributes towards both adaptation and mitigation from both bilateral contributors and multilateral climate funds. This makes it more difficult to track the progress made in ramping up adaptation finance. When, however, considering flows based on other groupings, there are variations in the composition of the types of support.

40. Grants continue to be a key instrument for the provision of adaptation finance. In the period 2015–2016 grants accounted for 62 and 94 per cent of the face value of bilateral adaptation finance reported to OECD and of adaptation finance from the multilateral climate funds, respectively. During the same period, 9 per cent of adaptation finance flowing through MDBs was grant-based. Mitigation finance remains less concessional in nature, with 25 per cent of bilateral flows, 31 per cent of multilateral climate fund approvals and 4 per cent of MDB investments taking the form of grants. These figures, however, may not fully capture the added value brought by combining different types of financial instruments, or technical assistance with capital flows, which can often lead to greater innovation or more sustainable implementation.

41. With regard to geographic distribution, Asia remains the principal recipient region of public climate finance flows. In the period 2015–2016, the region received 31 per cent of funding from multilateral climate funds, 42 per cent of bilateral finance reported to OECD and 41 per cent of MDB flows (including to the Pacific region). The Latin America and Caribbean region and sub‑Saharan Africa each secured 22 per cent of approvals from the multilateral climate funds in the same period. Latin America and the Caribbean received 17 per cent of MDB financing and 10 per cent of bilateral finance reported to OECD, whereas sub-Saharan Africa received just 9 per cent of MDB financing but 30 per cent of bilateral finance reported to OECD.

42. With regard to flows to the least developed countries (LDCs) and small island developing States (SIDS) in the period 2015–2016, funding directed at the LDCs represented 24 per cent of bilateral flows, whereas that directed at SIDS accounted for 2 per cent of such flows. Of the bilateral finance provided to the LDCs and SIDS, around half was earmarked for adaptation. Similarly, 21 per cent of finance approved by multilateral climate funds went to the LDCs and 13 per cent to SIDS, and more than half of this finance was focused on adaptation. MDBs channelled 15 per cent of their climate finance to the LDCs and SIDS. The percentage of adaptation spending to these countries (41 per cent) is twice their climate finance spending overall.

43. The management of climate finance, as well as the development and implementation of the projects that it supports, necessarily entails costs. The degree of such costs, which are often recovered through mechanisms such as administrative budgets and implementing agency fees, varies across institutions. Among the major multilateral climate change funds, fees account for between 1 and 9 per cent of total fund value, ranging from USD 65,000 to USD 1.2 million per project. Although these costs tend to decrease over time as management and disbursement mechanisms become more streamlined, there is evidence to suggest that the alignment of administrative functions between funds (e.g. the Global Environment Facility administration of the Least Developed Countries Fund and Special Climate Change Fund) offers the best opportunity to keep administrative costs down. This is essential in order to retain the trust that providers and recipients place in the funds.

44. The push to diversify modalities of access to climate finance continues. Institutions in beneficiary countries are increasingly able to meet fiduciary and environmental and social safeguard requirements for accessing funds. There has been a notable increase in the number of regional and national implementing entities to the multilateral climate funds, despite large amounts remaining programmed through multilateral entities.

45. Ownership remains a critical factor in the delivery of effective climate finance. A broad concept of ownership encompasses the consistency of climate finance with national priorities, the degree to which national systems are used for both spending and tracking, and the engagement of a wide range of stakeholders. There have been a number of efforts to build capacity to access and make strategic choices about how to use finance and oversee implementation. With regard to the role of governments, while there has been greater commitment by ministries of finance and planning to integrate climate finance into national budgetary planning, this is often not done fully. National-level institutions in beneficiary countries are playing a greater role in managing climate finance, particularly through domestic tracking systems. NDCs for which further financial resources need to be found are emerging as a platform that governments can use to stimulate engagement and strengthen national ownership of climate finance.

46. Mechanisms for monitoring the impact of climate finance have improved, albeit not uniformly. Thus, although the reporting of results (in terms of outputs) has increased, it is difficult to assess properly the quality of the impacts achieved (i.e. outcomes). These impacts are, moreover, presented in a multitude of formats. The reduction of GHG emissions remains the primary impact metric for climate change mitigation. Core mitigation-related multilateral funds are expected to reduce GHG emissions by over 11 billion tonne of carbon dioxide equivalent (t CO2 eq), with reported reductions already approaching 37 million t CO2 eq. GHG reduction results are complemented by other quantitative data, such as the number of beneficiaries and the renewable energy capacity installed. The metrics, benchmarks and frameworks for monitoring the impact of mitigation projects continue to evolve, thereby helping to inform investment decisions.

47. Discussion on impact measurement of adaptation projects continues to be focused on the number and type of people that benefit from them, although the nature and extent of their beneficial effects are still difficult to quantify, both directly and indirectly. Adaptation finance channelled through core multilateral climate funds has so far reached over 20 million direct beneficiaries. The target for the combined number of direct and indirect beneficiaries is 290 million. Further work is necessary to develop adaptation and resilience metrics that can capture the whole spectrum of sectors receiving support and the many different approaches used, while allowing for aggregation of data and comparability between projects and funds.

48. The extent of co-financing remains important for the mobilization of private finance, but is challenged in terms of the availability of data, definitions and methods. Research suggests that multilateral climate funds can perform on a par with DFIs with regard to private co-financing ratios. The degree to which such finance can be mobilized, however, is often heavily influenced by the investment conditions in a country, which are in turn created by the policy and regulatory frameworks in place.


**Information relevant to Article 2, paragraph 1(c), of the Paris Agreement: climate finance in context**

49. Climate finance continues to account for just a small proportion of overall finance flows (see figure 3); the level of climate finance is considerably below what one would expect given the investment opportunities and needs that have been identified. However, although climate finance flows must obviously be scaled up, it is also important to ensure the consistency of finance flows as a whole (and of capital stock) pursuant to Article 2, paragraph 1(c), of the Paris Agreement. This does not mean that all finance flows have to achieve explicitly beneficial climate outcomes, but that they must reduce the likelihood of negative climate outcomes. Although commitments are being made to ensure that finance flows from DFIs are climate consistent, more can be done to understand public finance flows and ensure that they are all are consistent with countries’ climate change and sustainable development objectives.

50. Awareness of climate risk in the financial sector has increased over the past few years. Positive developments are being seen in the sector, particularly with regard to the investment and lending policies of both public and private sector actors, and with regard to regulatory and fiscal policies and the information resources that guide decision-making.

Figure 3

**Climate finance in context**



*Note*: All flows are global and annual for 2016 unless stated otherwise. Energy investment needs are modelled under a 2 °C scenario. The representation of stocks that overlap is not necessarily reflective of real-world overlaps. The flows represented are not representative of all flows contributing to the stocks presented. Data points are provided to place climate finance in context and do not represent an aggregate or systematic view. Climate finance flows are those represented in section B of the Summary and Recommendations and as reported in chapter 2 of the 2018 Biennial Assessment and Overview of Climate Finance Flows technical report. Investment in renewable energy overlaps with this estimate of climate finance flows.

*Source:* See figure 3.9 in the 2018 Biennial Assessment and Overview of Climate Finance Flows technical report.

IV. Recommendations

51. The SCF invites the COP to consider the following recommendations:

Chapter I (methodologies)

(a) *Request* developed country Parties and *encourage* developing country Parties, building on progress made so far and ongoing work, to continue enhancing the transparency, consistency and comparability of data on climate finance provided and mobilized through public interventions, and taking into consideration developments in relevant organizations and institutions;

(b) *Encourage* Parties providing climate finance to enhance their reporting of climate finance provided to developing country Parties;

(c) *Invite* Parties, through their board memberships in international financial institutions, to encourage continued efforts in the harmonization of methodologies for tracking and reporting climate finance among international organizations;

(d) *Encourage* developing country Parties, building on progress made so far and ongoing work, to consider, as appropriate, enhancing their reporting on the underlying assumptions, definitions and methodologies used in generating information on financial, technical and capacity-building needs and support received;

Chapter II (overview)

(e) *Encourage* Parties, building on progress made so far, to enhance their tracking and reporting on climate finance flows from all sources;

(f) *Encourage* developing country Parties that provide support to report information on climate finance provided to other developing country Parties;

(g) *Encourage* developed countries and climate finance providers, as well as multilateral and financial institutions, private finance data providers and other relevant institutions, to enhance the availability of granular, country-level data on mitigation and adaptation finance, inter alia, transport, agriculture, forests, water and waste;

(h) *Invite* private sector associations and financial institutions to build on the progress made on ways to improve data on climate finance and to engage with the SCF, including through their participation in the forums of the SCF with a view to enhancing the quality of the BA;

(i) *Request* the SCF to continue its work in the mapping of available data sets that integrate climate change considerations into insurance, lending and investment decision-making processes, and to include information relevant to Article 2, paragraph 1(c), of the Paris Agreement in future BAs;

Chapter III (assessment)

(j) *Invite* Parties to strive for complementarity between climate finance and sustainable development by, inter alia, aligning climate finance with national climate change frameworks and priorities, as well as broader economic development policies and national budgetary planning;

(k) *Encourage* developing countries to take advantage of available resources through the operating entities of the Financial Mechanism to strengthen institutional capacity for programming their priority climate action, as well as tracking climate finance, effectiveness and impacts;

(l) *Encourage* developed countries and climate finance providers to continue to enhance country ownership and consider policies to balance funding for adaptation and mitigation, taking into account beneficiary country strategies, and, in line with the mandates, building on experiences, policies and practices of the operating entities of the Financial Mechanism, particularly the GCF;

(m) *Encourage* climate finance providers to improve tracking and reporting on gender-related aspects of climate finance, impact measuring and mainstreaming;

(n) *Invite*, as in the 2016 BA, multilateral climate funds, MDBs, other financial institutions and relevant international organizations to continue to advance work on tracking and reporting on impacts of mitigation and adaptation finance;

(o) *Encourage* all relevant United Nations agencies and international, regional and national financial institutions to provide information to Parties through the secretariat on how their development assistance and climate finance programmes incorporate climate-proofing and climate-resilience measures, in line with new available scientific information;

(p) *Request* the SCF, in preparing future BAs, to continue assessing available information on the alignment of climate finance with investment needs and plans related to Parties’ NDCs and national adaptation plans;

(q) *Request* the SCF, in preparing the 2020 BA, to take into consideration available information relevant to Article 2 of the Paris Agreement.

*10th plenary meeting*

*15 December 2018*

Decision 5/CP.24

Report of the Green Climate Fund to the Conference of the Parties and guidance to the Green Climate Fund

*The Conference of the Parties*,

*Noting* the draft guidance to the Green Climate Fund prepared by the Standing Committee on Finance,[[32]](#footnote-33)

*Recalling* decision 10/CP.22, paragraph 5,

1. *Welcomes* the report of the Green Climate Fund to the Conference of the Parties at its twenty-fourth session and its addendum,[[33]](#footnote-34) including the list of actions taken by the Board of the Green Climate Fund (hereinafter referred to as the Board) in response to guidance received from the Conference of the Parties;

2. *Also welcomes* the progress of the Green Climate Fund in 2018, including:

(a) That funding approved by the Board has reached USD 5.5 billion, including USD 4.6 billion in loans, grants, equities and guarantees in the past three years for the implementation of 93 funding proposals for adaptation and mitigation in 96 developing countries;

(b) The work to strengthen the Green Climate Fund’s institutional capacity, standards and safeguards, transparency, inclusiveness, pipeline and role within the climate finance landscape;

(c) The decision of the Board[[34]](#footnote-35) to initiate a review of the performance of the Green Climate Fund to assess the progress of the Fund in delivering on its mandate as set out in its Governing Instrument;

(d) The decision of the Board[[35]](#footnote-36) concerning the selection process for the appointment of the Executive Director of the Green Climate Fund secretariat;

(e) The decision of the Board to select and appoint the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development as the trustee of the Green Climate Fund;

(f) Efforts made to improve access to the Green Climate Fund through the structured dialogues and the Readiness and Preparatory Support Programme;

(g) The increase in the number of entities accredited by the Board, including direct access entities;

(h) The implementation of the simplified approvals process, including the approval of four projects worth USD 30.1 million in Green Climate Fund funding to date;

(i) The collaboration in 2018 between the Green Climate Fund and the Technology Executive Committee and the Climate Technology Centre and Network;

(j) The decision of the Board[[36]](#footnote-37) on financial planning in 2019 and the allocation of up to USD 600 million to fund projects submitted in response to requests for proposals and pilot programmes, including the requests for “proposals on REDD-plus results-based payments”, mobilizing funds at scale, micro, small and medium-sized enterprises, enhanced direct access and the simplified approvals process;

(k) The first annual report on complementarity and coherence with the Green Climate Fund and other climate finance channels;

3. *Further welcomes* the report on the implementation of the 2018 workplan and the approval of the 2019 workplan of the Board, and *urges* the Board to address remaining policy gaps, including on, as specified in the Fund’s Governing Instrument and its rules of procedure:

(a) Policies relating to:

(i) The approval of funding proposals, including project and programme eligibility and selection criteria, incremental costs, co-financing, concessionality, programmatic approach, restructuring and cancellation;

(ii) Prohibited practices as well as the implementation of the anti-money-laundering and countering the financing of terrorism policy;

(b) Review of the accreditation framework;

(c) Pursuing privileges and immunities for the Green Climate Fund;

(d) Consideration of alternative policy approaches, such as joint mitigation and adaptation approaches for the integral and sustainable management of forests;[[37]](#footnote-38)

(e) The requests for proposals to support climate technology incubators and accelerators, in accordance with Board decision B.18/03;

4. *Urges* the Board to continue its consideration of procedures for adopting decisions in the event that all efforts at reaching consensus have been exhausted, as specified in the Fund’s Governing Instrument;

5. *Welcomes* the launching of the first formal replenishment process and the Board’s decisions on the inputs and processes related to the Fund’s replenishment,[[38]](#footnote-39) which take into account the needs of developing countries;

6. *Stresses* the urgency to reach pledges for the first formal replenishment process aiming to conclude the process in October 2019;

7. *Takes note* of the independent evaluations of the readiness and preparatory support programme and encourages the Board to address the recommendations contained therein, in accordance with paragraph 59 of the Governing Instrument, with a view to improving access to the Green Climate Fund and increasing the Fund’s efforts to support country ownership and country programming;

8. *Reaffirms* the necessity to focus on implementation and to speed up disbursement of funds to already approved projects as a key element of the Green Climate Fund’s operations in line with agreed disbursement schedules;

9. *Invites* Parties to submit to the secretariat via the submission portal,[[39]](#footnote-40) no later than 10 weeks prior to the twenty-fifth session of the Conference of the Parties (December 2019), their views and recommendations on elements to be taken into account in developing guidance for the Board;

10. *Requests* the Standing Committee on Finance to take into consideration the submissions referred to in paragraph 9 above when preparing its draft guidance for the Board for consideration by the Conference of the Parties;

11. *Also requests* the Board to include in its annual report to the Conference of the Parties information on the steps that it has taken to implement the guidance provided in this decision;

12. *Decides*, in accordance with decision 1/CP.21, paragraph 61, to transmit to the Green Climate Fund the guidance from the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement contained in the decisions referred to in decision 3/CMA.1, paragraph 4.

*10th plenary meeting*

*15 December 2018*

Decision 6/CP.24

Report of the Global Environment Facility to the Conference of the Parties and guidance to the Global Environment Facility

*The Conference of the Parties*,

*Noting* the draft guidance to the Global Environment Facility prepared by the Standing Committee on Finance,[[40]](#footnote-41)

1. *Welcomes* the report of the Global Environment Facility to the Conference of the Parties and its addendum,[[41]](#footnote-42) including the responses of the Global Environment Facility to guidance from the Conference of the Parties;

2. *Also welcomes* the seventh replenishment of the Global Environment Facility (July 2018 to June 2022);

3. *Recognizes with concern* the decrease in allocation to the climate change focal area, including the System for Transparent Allocation of Resources, compared with the sixth replenishment;

4. *Urges* all Parties that have not made pledges for the seventh replenishment of the Global Environment Facility to do so as soon as possible;

5. *Acknowledges* the increased integration of climate change priorities into other focal areas and the impact programmes in the seventh replenishment of the Global Environment Facility, as well as the increased focus on innovation and enhanced synergies with other focal areas;

6. *Highlights* the importance of enhancing country ownership in the impact programmes of the seventh replenishment of the Global Environment Facility;

7. *Requests* the Global Environment Facility, as appropriate, to ensure that its policies and procedures related to the consideration and review of funding proposals are duly followed in an efficient manner;

8. *Looks forward* to the projected delivery of greenhouse gas emission reductions in the seventh replenishment period, which is twice the amount planned for the sixth replenishment;

9. *Acknowledges* the updated policy on co-financing of the Global Environment Facility,[[42]](#footnote-43) which sets out an ambition for the overall portfolio of the Global Environment Facility to reach an increased ratio of co-financing to its project financing;

10. *Recognizes* that the Global Environment Facility does not impose minimum thresholds and/or specific types or sources of co-financing or investment mobilized in its review of individual projects and programmes;[[43]](#footnote-44)

11. *Welcomes* the inclusion of support for the Capacity-building Initiative for Transparency in the seventh replenishment of the Global Environment Facility, which enhances predictability of funding for the Initiative;

12. *Requests* the Global Environment Facility to continue to manage the Capacity-building Initiative for Transparency to fund a diversity of countries and regions, taking into account each country’s capacity, in line with priorities of support as contained in the programming directions of the Capacity-building Initiative for Transparency;[[44]](#footnote-45)

13. *Invites* the Global Environment Facility to enhance the information in its reports to the Conference of the Parties on the outcomes of the collaboration between the Poznan strategic programme on technology transfer’s climate technology and finance centres and the Climate Technology Centre and Network;

14. *Requests* the Global Environment Facility to continue to monitor the geographic and thematic coverage, as well as the effectiveness, efficiency and engagement, of the Global Environment Facility Partnership, and to consider the participation of additional national and regional entities, as appropriate;

15. *Welcomes* the establishment of the private sector advisory group;

16. *Encourages* a balanced composition of the private sector advisory group in terms of gender and geographical coverage;

17. *Welcomes* the Global Environment Facility Council’s decision[[45]](#footnote-46) to begin the process of developing improved fiduciary standards, including anti-money-laundering and counter-terrorism finance policy and *requests* the Global Environment Facility to include updates on this work in its report to the Conference of the Parties at its twenty-fifth session (December 2019);

18. *Requests* the Global Environment Facility to review and, if necessary, update or adopt policies for preventing sexual harassment and the abuse of authority with the aim of protecting the staff of the Global Environment Facility secretariat as well as its partner organizations against unwanted sexual advances, preventing inappropriate behaviour and abuse of power and providing guidelines for reporting incidents;

19. *Invites* Parties to submit to the secretariat via the submission portal,[[46]](#footnote-47) no later than 10 weeks prior to the twenty-fifth session of the Conference of the Parties, their views and recommendations on elements to be taken into account in developing guidance for the Global Environment Facility;

20. *Requests* the Standing Committee on Finance to take into consideration the submissions referred to in paragraph 19 above when preparing its draft guidance for the Global Environment Facility for consideration by the Conference of the Parties;

21. *Also requests* the Global Environment Facility to include in its annual report to the Conference of the Parties information on the steps that it has taken to implement the guidance provided in this decision;

22. *Decides*, in accordance with decision 1/CP.21, paragraph 61, to transmit to the Global Environment Facility the guidance from the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement contained in the decisions referred to in decision 3/CMA.1 paragraph 4.

*10th plenary meeting*

*15 December 2018*

Decision 7/CP.24

Modalities, work programme and functions under the Convention of the forum on the impact of the implementation of response measures

*The Conference of the Parties*,

*Recalling* Article 4 of the Convention,

*Also recalling* Article 2 and Article 3, paragraph 14, of the Kyoto Protocol,

*Reaffirming* Article 4, paragraph 15, of the Paris Agreement,

*Recalling* decisions 1/CP.16, 2/CP.17, 8/CP.17, 1/CP.21 and 11/CP.21,

*Recognizing* that Parties may be affected not only by climate change but also by the impacts of the measures taken in response to it,

*Acknowledging* that there are both positive and negative impacts associated with measures taken in response to climate change,

*Also acknowledging* that response measures should be understood in the broader context of the transition towards low greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient development,

*Reaffirming* that Parties should cooperate to promote a supportive and inclusive international economic system that will lead to sustainable economic growth and development in all Parties,

1. *Recalls* decision 5/CMP.7, paragraph 4, and decision 1/CP.21, paragraph 33, by which it was decided, inter alia, that the forum on the impact of the implementation of response measures shall also serve the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement;

2. *Adopts* the modalities, work programme and functions of the forum on the impact of the implementation of response measures as contained in the annex to decision 7/CMA.1 for the work of the forum under the Convention;

3. *Acknowledges* that there is one single forum that covers the work of the Conference of the Parties, the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol and the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement on all matters relating to the impact of the implementation of response measures;

4. *Affirms* that the forum on the impact of the implementation of response measures shall continue to report to the Conference of the Parties in respect of matters falling under Article 4, paragraphs 8 and 10, of the Convention where the forum requires the guidance of the Conference of the Parties.

*10th plenary meeting*

*15 December 2018*

Decision 8/CP.24

National adaptation plans

*The Conference of the Parties*,

*Recalling* decisions 1/CP.16, 3/CP.17, 5/CP.17, 12/CP.18, 18/CP.19, 3/CP.20, 1/CP.21, 4/CP.21 and 6/CP.22,

*Acknowledging* that progress in the process to formulate and implement national adaptation plans will contribute towards enhancing adaptive capacity, strengthening resilience and reducing vulnerability to climate change,

1. *Acknowledges* that developing country Parties have made progress in the process to formulate and implement national adaptation plans, and that countries are at different stages of the process;[[47]](#footnote-48)

2. *Also acknowledges* that progress has been made in addressing the objective of the process to formulate and implement national adaptation plans for integrating adaptation into development planning;

3. *Further acknowledges* that there is not enough information to assess the extent to which the process to formulate and implement national adaptation plans is reducing vulnerability to climate change, strengthening resilience and building adaptive capacity;

4. *Notes* that experience from prior work on adaptation, in particular on the national adaptation programmes of action, has provided many lessons for the process to formulate and implement national adaptation plans;

5. *Recognizes* that the process-based approach to formulating and implementing national adaptation plans is proving to be a good practice as it focuses on long-term, iterative capacity development, enabling environments, institutions and policies, and the implementation of concrete actions through projects and programmes;

6. *Also recognizes* the value of learning from various climate shocks in furthering the understanding of vulnerability and risk and in helping to identify adaptation actions that would do the most to save lives and livelihoods;

7. *Welcomes* the submissions from Colombia, Saint Lucia and Togo of their national adaptation plans in NAP Central,[[48]](#footnote-49) bringing the total number of submitted national adaptation plans to 11, and *reiterates* its invitation[[49]](#footnote-50) to Parties to forward outputs and outcomes related to the process to formulate and implement national adaptation plans to NAP Central or other means as appropriate;

8. *Recognizes* that it will be useful for Parties to undertake monitoring and evaluation of the efforts of their adaptation actions at the national, subnational and local level to increase understanding of progress on adaptation;

9. *Notes* that funding has been made available for developing country Parties under the Green Climate Fund, the Least Developed Countries Fund and the Special Climate Change Fund for the process to formulate and implement national adaptation plans, and that other channels of bilateral, multilateral and domestic support have also contributed significantly to enabling developing countries to advance their work in the process to formulate and implement national adaptation plans;

10. *Welcomes* the approval by the Green Climate Fund secretariat, as at 4 December 2018, of 22 proposals from developing countries under the Green Climate Fund Readiness and Preparatory Support Programme to support the formulation of national adaptation plans and/or other adaptation planning processes amounting to USD 81 million, of which 6 proposals, amounting to USD 15 million, are from the least developed countries;

11. *Also welcomes* the approval by the Least Developed Countries Fund of 11 proposals, as at 30 September 2018, from the least developed countries for funding for the process to formulate and implement national adaptation plans amounting to USD 55 million;

12. *Notes* the value of engaging non-Party stakeholders, including civil society, the private sector, financial institutions, cities and other subnational authorities, and local communities and indigenous peoples, as appropriate, in the process to formulate and implement national adaptation plans;

13. *Also notes with appreciation* the workshop convened by the Adaptation Committee on fostering engagement of the agrifood sector in resilience to climate change;[[50]](#footnote-51)

14. *Welcomes* the progress made by the Adaptation Committee and the Least Developed Countries Expert Group in their respective engagement with the Green Climate Fund on ways to enhance the process of accessing support for the formulation and implementation of national adaptation plans[[51]](#footnote-52) and *encourages* its continuation;

15. *Notes with appreciation* the work of relevant organizations in providing technical support to countries on the process to formulate and implement national adaptation plans;

16. *Notes* that gaps and needs related to the process to formulate and implement national adaptation plans remain;[[52]](#footnote-53)

17. *Requests* the Least Developed Countries Expert Group, within its existing mandate and workplan, to consider gaps and needs related to the process to formulate and implement national adaptation plans that have been identified through the relevant work of the Least Developed Countries Expert Group and the Adaptation Committee and how to address them, and to include relevant information thereon in its report to the Subsidiary Body for Implementation at its fifty-first session (December 2019);

18. *Also requests* the Adaptation Committee, through its task force on national adaptation plans and within its existing mandate and workplan, to consider gaps and needs that have been identified through relevant work of the Least Developed Countries Expert Group and the Adaptation Committee and how to address them, and include relevant information thereon in its annual report for 2019;

19. *Further requests* the Subsidiary Body for Implementation to specify the actions and steps necessary to assess progress in the process to formulate and implement national adaptation plans at its fifty-fifth session (November 2021), with a view to launching the assessment not later than 2025 and noting plans for the first global stocktake;

20. *Notes* the importance of vulnerability and risk assessments in setting priorities, mapping scenarios and understanding progress in implementing adaptation actions, and the important work of partner organizations of the Nairobi work programme on impacts, vulnerability and adaptation to climate change in providing information on methodologies for understanding baselines and progression of vulnerability and risk to developing countries;

21. *Welcomes* the efforts of the World Meteorological Organization and other relevant organizations in providing capacity-building to developing countries, as appropriate, on the analysis of climate data and the development and application of climate change scenarios in vulnerability and risk assessment;

22. *Encourages* relevant organizations to continue coordinating support related to the process to formulate and implement national adaptation plans and to continue sharing lessons learned;

23. *Invites* Parties to continue providing information on progress towards the achievement of the objectives of the process to formulate and implement national adaptation plans and on experience, best practices, lessons learned, gaps and needs, and support provided and received in the process to formulate and implement national adaptation plans via the online questionnaire[[53]](#footnote-54) on NAP Central or other means as appropriate.

*7th plenary meeting*

*13 December 2018*

Decision 9/CP.24

Report of the Adaptation Committee

*The Conference of the Parties*,

1. *Welcomes* the report of the Adaptation Committee,[[54]](#footnote-55) including the recommendations and the flexible workplan of the Committee for 2019–2021 contained therein;

2. *Notes* *with appreciation* the progress of the Adaptation Committee in implementing its 2016–2018 workplan;[[55]](#footnote-56)

3. *Welcomes* the technical expert meetings on adaptation[[56]](#footnote-57) organized as part of the technical examination process on adaptation, and the technical paper on opportunities and options for enhancing adaptation planning in relation to vulnerable ecosystems, communities and groups;[[57]](#footnote-58)

4. *Expresses its appreciation* to the Parties and organizations that led and participated in the technical expert meetings on adaptation or organized regional technical expert meetings on adaptation in 2018;

5. *Encourages* Parties and organizations to build on the outcomes of the regional technical expert meetings held in 2018 when planning and implementing adaptation action and to continue to organize such meetings in 2019 with a view to enhancing adaptation action and its overall coherence;

6. *Also encourages* Parties to strengthen adaptation planning, including by engaging in the process to formulate and implement national adaptation plans, taking into account linkages with the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals and possible co-benefits between mitigation and adaptation, and by mainstreaming adaptation in development planning;

7. *Urges* Parties and non-Party stakeholders to mainstream gender considerations in all stages of their adaptation planning processes, including national adaptation plans and the implementation of adaptation action, taking into account available guidance;[[58]](#footnote-59)

8. *Encourages* Parties to apply a participatory approach to adaptation planning and implementation so as to make use of stakeholder input, including from the private sector, civil society, indigenous peoples, local communities, migrants, children and youth, persons with disabilities and people in vulnerable situations in general;

9. *Also encourages* Parties to take an iterative approach to adaptation planning, implementation and investment, with the long-term goal of transformational change, to ensure that adaptation is flexible, robust and not maladaptive and to allow for the integration, at least periodically, of the best available science;

10. *Further encourages* Parties to take into consideration and utilize, as appropriate, various approaches to adaptation planning, including community-based adaptation, ecosystem-based adaptation, livelihood and economic diversification and risk-based approaches, and to ensure that such approaches are not mutually exclusive but rather are complementary, allowing for synergy in enhancing resilience;

11. *Invites* relevant institutions under the Convention and non-Party stakeholders to strengthen support (financial, technical, technological and capacity-building) for adaptation planning, including for collecting climate data and information, noting the urgent need for adaptation action to address current and short- and long-term risks of climate change;

12. *Also invites* Parties and interested organizations to share case studies of initiatives that focus on ecosystems and adaptation planning for vulnerable communities and groups as agents of change;

13. *Requests* that the case studies referred to in paragraph 12 above be disseminated on the adaptation knowledge portal of the Nairobi work programme on impacts, vulnerability and adaptation to climate change with a view to enhancing the translation of knowledge into practice;

14. *Invites* Parties and relevant entities working on national adaptation goals and indicators to strengthen linkages with the monitoring systems of the Sustainable Development Goals and the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030 taking into account:

(a) The importance of designing adaptation monitoring and evaluation systems according to countries’ overall objectives for adaptation, and of considering the benefits and drawbacks of quantitative and qualitative indicators when developing methodologies;

(b) That although full and complete harmonization of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030 and the Paris Agreement may not be feasible or useful, some degree of synergy could be beneficial;

(c) That enhancing individual and institutional technical capacity for data collection and assessment of adaptation is an ongoing task for many countries, and that increased capacity could help to link data gathering and reporting systems for the three global agendas referred to in paragraph 14(b) above at the national level;

(d) That improved coordination results in a reduced reporting burden for countries and enhanced cost-effectiveness of measures that cut across the three global agendas;

(e) That subnational monitoring and evaluation programmes should be linked with national-level monitoring and evaluation systems to provide a complete picture of adaptation action;

15. *Notes* *with concern* the shortfall in the resources available to the Adaptation Committee, the need for supplementary financial resources and the estimated budgetary implications of the activities to be undertaken by the secretariat pursuant to decision 1/CP.21;[[59]](#footnote-60)

16. *Encourages* Parties to make available sufficient resources for the Adaptation Committee’s successful and timely implementation of its workplan for 2019–2021;

17. *Requests* that the actions of the secretariat called for in this decision be undertaken subject to the availability of financial resources.

*12th plenary meeting*

*15 December 2018*

Decision 10/CP.24

Report of the Executive Committee of the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage associated with Climate Change Impacts

*The Conference of the Parties*,

*Recalling* decisions 3/CP.18, 2/CP.19 and 2/CP.20,

*Also recalling* Article 8 of the Paris Agreement,

*Further recalling* decision 4/CP.22, in which it recommended that a review of the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage associated with Climate Change Impacts be held in 2019 and a technical paper be prepared as input, as well as that the subsidiary bodies finalize terms of reference for the review at their fiftieth sessions (June 2019),

*Recalling* decision 5/CP.23, in which it invited Parties, relevant organizations and other stakeholders to submit their views and inputs, by 1 February 2019, on possible elements to be included in the terms of reference for the review, for consideration by the subsidiary bodies at their sessions to be held in June 2019,

*Noting* the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5 °C,[[60]](#footnote-61)

1. *Welcomes*:

(a) The annual report of the Executive Committee of the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage associated with Climate Change Impacts;[[61]](#footnote-62)

(b) The progress made by the Executive Committee in implementing its five-year rolling workplan;[[62]](#footnote-63)

(c) The report of the task force on displacement[[63]](#footnote-64) and its comprehensive assessment of broader issues of displacement related to climate change in response to decision 1/CP.21, paragraph 49;

(d) The report of the Suva expert dialogue,[[64]](#footnote-65) noting the role of the dialogue in informing the preparation of the technical paper referred to in decision 4/CP.22, paragraph 2(f);

2. *Notes with appreciation*the work undertaken by the organizations[[65]](#footnote-66) comprising the task force on displacement in response to decision 1/CP.21, paragraph 49;

3. *Invites* Parties, bodies under the Convention and the Paris Agreement, United Nations agencies and relevant stakeholders to consider the recommendations contained in the annex when undertaking relevant work, as appropriate;

4. *Welcomes* the decision[[66]](#footnote-67) of the Executive Committee to extend the mandate of the task force on displacement in accordance with terms of reference to be elaborated by the Executive Committee at its next meeting;

5. *Encourages* the Executive Committee:

(a) To seek ways to continue enhancing its responsiveness, effectiveness and performance in implementing activities in its five-year rolling workplan, particularly those under workstream (e);[[67]](#footnote-68)

(b) To continue its work on human mobility under strategic workstream (d) of its five-year rolling workplan,[[68]](#footnote-69) including by considering the activities set out in paragraphs 38 and 39 of its report referred to in paragraph 1(a) above;

(c) To draw upon the work, information and expertise of bodies under the Convention and the Paris Agreement, as well as international processes, such as the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030, including when executing its work through the technical expert group on comprehensive risk management established under workstream (c) of the five-year rolling workplan;[[69]](#footnote-70)

(d) To continue consideration of scientific information needs and knowledge gaps with the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and other scientific organizations;

(e) To increase its consideration of groups vulnerable to the adverse impacts of climate change when implementing its five-year rolling workplan;

6. *Also encourages* Parties and *invites* relevant organizations to make available sufficient resources for the successful and timely implementation of the five-year rolling workplan of the Executive Committee, including, as applicable, the associated expert groups, subcommittees, panels, thematic advisory groups and task-focused ad hoc working groups;

7. *Expresses* its appreciation to the organizers of and participants in the Suva expert dialogue, held during the first part of the forty-eighth sessions of the subsidiary bodies under the guidance of the Executive Committee and the Chair of the Subsidiary Body for Implementation;

8. *Invites* relevant organizations and other stakeholders to collaborate with the Executive Committee, including through partnerships, in developing and disseminating products that support national focal points, loss and damage contact points and other relevant entities in raising awareness of averting, minimizing and addressing loss and damage;

9. *Takes note* of the assistance provided by the Executive Committee to the secretariat in determining the scope of the technical paper referred to in decision 4/CP.22, paragraph 2(f);

10. *Invites* Parties:

(a) To consider developing policies, plans and strategies, as appropriate, and to facilitate coordinated action and the monitoring of progress, where applicable, in their efforts to avert, minimize and address loss and damage;

(b) To take into consideration future climate risks when developing and implementing their relevant national plans and strategies that seek to avert, minimize and address loss and damage and reduce disaster risks, as appropriate;

11. *Takes* *note* of the estimated budgetary implications of the activities to be undertaken by the secretariat referred to in this decision;

12. *Requests* that the actions of the secretariat called for in this decision be undertaken subject to the availability of financial resources.

Annex

Recommendations from the report of the Executive Committee of the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage associated with Climate Change Impacts on integrated approaches to averting, minimizing and addressing displacement related to the adverse impacts of climate change

1. The following recommendations of the Executive Committee of the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage associated with Climate Change Impacts are based on the work of the task force on displacement, established by the Executive Committee in response to decision 1/CP.21, paragraph 49:

(a) Acknowledge the inputs and contributions from participants of the stakeholder consultation workshop of the task force on displacement organized by the International Organization for Migration and the Platform on Disaster Displacement, and submissions from others;

(b) Take note of the report on the stakeholder consultation workshop of the task force on displacement;

(c) Strengthen coordination, coherence and collaboration across relevant bodies under the Convention and the Paris Agreement, and institutional arrangements, programmes and platforms, with a view to enhancing understanding of human mobility (including migration, displacement and planned relocation), both internal and cross-border, in the context of climate change, as they undertake their work, and in collaboration with the Executive Committee;

(d) Invite bodies under the Convention and the Paris Agreement, as appropriate and in accordance with their mandates and workplans, to facilitate the efforts of countries to, inter alia, develop climate change related risk assessments and improved standards for data collection on and analyses of internal and cross-border human mobility in a manner that includes the participation of communities affected by and at risk of displacement related to the adverse impacts of climate change;

(e) Invite the Adaptation Committee and the Least Developed Countries Expert Group, in accordance with their mandates and workplans, and in collaboration with the Executive Committee, to assist developing country Parties in integrating approaches to avert, minimize and address displacement related to the adverse impacts of climate change into relevant national planning processes, including the process to formulate and implement national adaptation plans, as appropriate;

(f) Invite Parties to facilitate the efforts of developing country Parties in the implementation of paragraph 2(g) below, as appropriate;

(g) Invite Parties:

(i) To consider formulating laws, policies and strategies, as appropriate, that reflect the importance of integrated approaches to avert, minimize and address displacement related to the adverse impacts of climate change and in the broader context of human mobility, taking into consideration their respective human rights obligations and, as appropriate, other relevant international standards and legal considerations;

(ii) To enhance research, data collection, risk analysis and sharing of information to better map, understand and manage human mobility related to the adverse impacts of climate change in a manner that includes the participation of communities affected and at risk of displacement related to the adverse impacts of climate change;

(iii) To strengthen preparedness, including early warning systems, contingency planning, evacuation planning and resilience-building strategies and plans, and develop innovative approaches, such as forecast-based financing,[[70]](#footnote-71) to avert, minimize and address displacement related to the adverse impacts of climate change;

(iv) To integrate climate change related human mobility challenges and opportunities into national planning processes, as appropriate, by drawing on available tools, guidance and good practices, and consider communicating these efforts undertaken, as appropriate;

(v) To recall the guiding principles on internal displacement and seek to strengthen efforts to find durable solutions for internally displaced people when working to implement integrated approaches to avert, minimize and address displacement related to the adverse impacts of climate change, as appropriate;

(vi) To facilitate orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration and mobility of people,[[71]](#footnote-72) as appropriate and in accordance with national laws and policies, in the context of climate change, by considering the needs of migrants and displaced persons, communities of origin, transit and destination, and by enhancing opportunities for regular migration pathways, including through labour mobility, consistent with international labour standards, as appropriate;

(h) Invite United Nations agencies, relevant organizations and other stakeholders, as appropriate and in accordance with their respective mandates:

(i) To continue supporting efforts, including finance, technology and capacity-building, of Parties and other actors, including with and for communities and local actors, in order to avert, minimize and address displacement related to the adverse impacts of climate change, at all levels, including the community, national, regional and international levels;

(ii) To support and enhance regional, subregional and transboundary cooperation, in relation to averting, minimizing and addressing displacement related to the adverse impacts of climate change, including for risk and vulnerability assessments, mapping, data analysis, preparedness and early warning systems;

(iii) To continue developing and sharing good practices, tools and guidance in relation to averting, minimizing and addressing displacement related to the adverse impacts of climate change, inter alia, in:

a. Understanding risk;

b. Accessing support, including finance, technology and capacity-building;

c. Providing assistance to, and protection of, within existing national laws and international protocols and conventions, as applicable, affected individuals and communities;

d. Applying international legal instruments and normative frameworks, as appropriate;

(i) Invite relevant United Nations agencies and other relevant stakeholders to provide the Executive Committee with information arising from their activities undertaken in relation to the work referred to in paragraph 1(h) above with a view to informing the work and future action of the Executive Committee and its expert groups, Parties and other stakeholders;

(j) Invite relevant United Nations agencies and other stakeholders to engage with bodies under the Convention, especially the Executive Committee, when facilitating the efforts of States to address challenges and opportunities associated with climate change related human mobility, including the Global Compact for Migration and the work of the international migration review forum, the United Nations Network on Migration and other relevant international frameworks and programmes of action, as appropriate, to avoid duplication on climate change aspects;

(k) Invite the Secretary-General to consider steps, including a system-wide strategic review, for greater coherence in the United Nations system to address human mobility in the context of climate change, and to facilitate the inclusion of integrated approaches to avert, minimize and address displacement related to the adverse impacts of climate change in the work of the envisaged high-level panel on internally displaced persons, as appropriate.

2. The technical members of the task force on displacement are from the International Labour Organization, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, the International Organization for Migration, the Platform on Disaster Displacement, the United Nations Development Programme, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, and civil society groups as represented by the Advisory Group on Climate Change and Human Mobility, which includes the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, the Norwegian Refugee Council, the Hugo Observatory, the Arab Network for Environment and Development, and Refugees International.

*9th plenary meeting*

*15 December 2018*

Decision 11/CP.24

Review of the terms of reference of the Consultative Group of Experts on National Communications from Parties not included in Annex I to the Convention

*The Conference of the Parties*,

*Recalling* the relevant provisions of the Convention, in particular Article 4, paragraphs 1, 3 and 7, and Article 12, paragraphs 1, 4, 5 and 7,

*Also recalling* decisions 8/CP.5, 3/CP.8, 17/CP.8, 8/CP.11, 5/CP.15, 1/CP.16, 2/CP.17, 14/CP.17, 17/CP.18, 18/CP.18, 13/CP.19, 19/CP.19, 20/CP.19 and 20/CP.22,

*Acknowledging* the contributions of the Consultative Group of Experts on National Communications from Parties not included in Annex I to the Convention to enhancing capacity-building and participation in measurement, reporting and verification arrangements for developing countries under the Convention,

*Recognizing* that the Consultative Group of Experts playsan important role in facilitating technical advice and support for the preparation and submission of national communications and biennial update reports,

*Also recognizing* that the preparation of national communications is a continuous process,

1. *Decides* to extend the term of the Consultative Group of Experts on National Communications from Parties not included in Annex I to the Convention for eight years, from 1 January 2019 to 31 December 2026, and to rename it the Consultative Group of Experts;

2. *Also decides* that the Consultative Group of Experts, in fulfilling its mandate, shall function in accordance with decision 19/CP.19 and its annex;

3. *Invites* a representative of Parties not included in Annex I to the Convention that are not represented by the constituencies referred to in decision 3/CP.8, annex, paragraphs 3–8, in the membership of the Consultative Group of Experts to continue to participate in the work of the Group in an observer capacity;

4. *Notes* decision 18/CMA.1, paragraph 15, whereby the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement decided that the Consultative Group of Experts shall serve the Paris Agreement starting from 1 January 2019 to support the implementation of the enhanced transparency framework under Article 13 of the Paris Agreement;

5. *Requests* the Subsidiary Body for Implementation, at its fiftieth session (June 2019), to review and revise the terms of reference of the Consultative Group of Experts taking into account the functions referred to in the annex to decision 19/CP.19, annual reports of the Consultative Group of Experts, and decision 18/CMA.1, paragraph 15, with a view to recommending a draft decision for consideration and adoption by the Conference of the Parties at its twenty-fifth session (December 2019);

6. *Also* *requests* that the actions of the secretariat called for in this decision be undertaken subject to the availability of financial resources.

*9th plenary meeting*

*15 December 2018*

1. In addition to the draft decisions listed, draft decision -/CMA.1 titled “Common time frames for nationally determined contributions referred to in Article 4, paragraph 10, of the Paris Agreement” (now decision 6/CMA.1) and draft decision -/CMA.1 titled “Ways of enhancing the implementation of education, training, public awareness, public participation and public access to information so as to enhance actions under the Paris Agreement” (now decision 17/CMA.1) were forwarded by the Subsidiary Body for Implementation at its forty-ninth session and at its forty-eighth session, respectively, for consideration and adoption by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement at the third part of its first session. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
2. The outcome on this matter is incorporated in chapter V of the annex to draft decision -/CMA.1 titled “Modalities, procedures and guidelines for the transparency framework for action and support referred to in Article 13 of the Paris Agreement” (adopted as decision 18/CMA.1). [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
3. As footnote 2 above. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
4. FCCC/CP/2018/8, annex II. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
5. Decision 1/CP.23, paragraph 18. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
6. Decision 1/CP.21, paragraph 35. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
7. Decision 1/CP.21, paragraph 23. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
8. Decision 1/CP.21, paragraph 24. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
9. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. 2018. *Global Warming of 1.5 °C: An IPCC Special Report on the impacts of global warming of 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels and related global greenhouse gas emission pathways in the context of strengthening the global response to the threat of climate change, sustainable development, and efforts to eradicate poverty*. Available at <http://ipcc.ch/report/sr15/>. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
10. Decision 1/CP.21, paragraph 20. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
11. For information on the outcome, inputs and outputs, see <https://talanoadialogue.com/>. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
12. Available at <https://cop24.gov.pl/presidency/initiatives/just-transition-declaration/>. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
13. Paragraph 6(a–c) of decision 2/CP.23. [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
14. <https://unfccc.int/submissions_and_statements>. [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
15. FCCC/CP/2018/8, annex II. [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
16. Available at <https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx>. [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
17. FCCC/CP/2018/4. [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
18. As per decision 7/CP.22, paragraph 16. [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
19. FCCC/CP/2018/8. [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
20. FCCC/CP/2018/8, annex VI. [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
21. <https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/2018%20BA%20Technical%20Report%20Final.pdf>. [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
22. FCCC/CP/2018/8, annex III. [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
23. FCCC/CP/2018/8, paragraph 14(g). [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
24. Decision 2/CP.17, paragraph 121(f). [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
25. Decision 1/CP.18, paragraph 71. [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
26. Decision 5/CP.18, paragraph 11. [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
27. Decision 3/CP.19, paragraph 11. [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
28. Decision 2/CP.17, annex I. [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
29. Decision 2/CP.17, annex III. [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
30. Approximately 52 per cent of the decrease in 2016 was due to reduced technology costs in solar photovoltaic and wind energy. [↑](#footnote-ref-31)
31. This includes Hebei Province in China, reporting an expenditure of USD 6.1 billion in 2015. [↑](#footnote-ref-32)
32. FCCC/CP/2018/8, annex IV. [↑](#footnote-ref-33)
33. FCCC/CP/2018/5 and Add.1. [↑](#footnote-ref-34)
34. Green Climate Fund Board decision B.21/17. [↑](#footnote-ref-35)
35. Green Climate Fund Board decision B.21/06. [↑](#footnote-ref-36)
36. Green Climate Fund Board decision B.21/14. [↑](#footnote-ref-37)
37. Decision 16/CP.21, paragraph 6, and decision 7/CP.21, paragraph 25. [↑](#footnote-ref-38)
38. Green Climate Fund Board decision B.21/18. [↑](#footnote-ref-39)
39. <https://unfccc.int/submissions_and_statements>. [↑](#footnote-ref-40)
40. FCCC/CP/2018/8, annex V. [↑](#footnote-ref-41)
41. FCCC/CP/2018/6 and Add.1. [↑](#footnote-ref-42)
42. Global Environment Facility Council decision GEF/C.54/10/Rev.01. [↑](#footnote-ref-43)
43. Global Environment Facility document GEF/C.54/10/Rev.01, annex I, paragraph 5. [↑](#footnote-ref-44)
44. Global Environment Facility document GEF/C.50/06, paragraph 26. [↑](#footnote-ref-45)
45. Global Environment Facility Council decision GEF/C.54/09/Rev.01. [↑](#footnote-ref-46)
46. <https://unfccc.int/submissions_and_statements>. [↑](#footnote-ref-47)
47. See document FCCC/SBI/2018/INF.13, table 4, for a summary of measures undertaken by developing country Parties. [↑](#footnote-ref-48)
48. <http://www4.unfccc.int/nap/Pages/national-adaptation-plans.aspx>. [↑](#footnote-ref-49)
49. Decision 3/CP.20, paragraph 9. [↑](#footnote-ref-50)
50. See <https://unfccc.int/node/182503>. [↑](#footnote-ref-51)
51. Decision 6/CP.22, paragraph 7. [↑](#footnote-ref-52)
52. FCCC/SBI/2018/6, paragraphs 29–32. [↑](#footnote-ref-53)
53. <https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/NAPC/Pages/assessingprogress.aspx>. [↑](#footnote-ref-54)
54. FCCC/SB/2018/3. [↑](#footnote-ref-55)
55. Contained in document FCCC/SB/2012/3, annex II. [↑](#footnote-ref-56)
56. See <http://tep-a.org>. [↑](#footnote-ref-57)
57. FCCC/TP/2018/3. [↑](#footnote-ref-58)
58. See document FCCC/TP/2016/2. [↑](#footnote-ref-59)
59. Information on the status of contributions is available in document FCCC/SBI/2018/INF.12 and information on budget performance in document FCCC/SBI/2018/16. [↑](#footnote-ref-60)
60. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. 2018. *Global Warming of 1.5 °C: An IPCC Special Report on the impacts of global warming of 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels and related global greenhouse gas emission pathways, in the context of strengthening the global response to the threat of climate change, sustainable development, and efforts to eradicate poverty*. Available at <http://ipcc.ch/report/sr15/>. [↑](#footnote-ref-61)
61. FCCC/SB/2018/1. [↑](#footnote-ref-62)
62. Contained in the annex to document FCCC/SB/2017/1/Add.1. [↑](#footnote-ref-63)
63. Available at <http://unfccc.int/node/285>. [↑](#footnote-ref-64)
64. Available at <https://unfccc.int/node/182364>. [↑](#footnote-ref-65)
65. The names of the organizations comprising the task force on displacement are listed in the annex. [↑](#footnote-ref-66)
66. See document FCCC/SB/2018/1, paragraph 36. [↑](#footnote-ref-67)
67. Strategic workstream (e): enhanced cooperation and facilitation in relation to action and support, including finance, technology and capacity-building, to address loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change. [↑](#footnote-ref-68)
68. Strategic workstream (d): enhanced cooperation and facilitation in relation to human mobility, including migration, displacement and planned relocation. [↑](#footnote-ref-69)
69. Strategic workstream (c): enhanced cooperation and facilitation in relation to comprehensive risk management approaches. [↑](#footnote-ref-70)
70. Forecast-based financing systems link climate and meteorological data with early warning systems and early action. They can play a supportive role in averting, minimizing and addressing impacts, including displacement, in the context of climate change. [↑](#footnote-ref-71)
71. See United Nations General Assembly document A/RES/70/1. [↑](#footnote-ref-72)